

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 CAIRO 19041 161238Z
ACTION NODS-00

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S E C R E T CAIRO 19041

EXDIS (DISTRIBUTE AS NODIS)

FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY SAUNDERS FROM AMBASSADOR

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PEPR PGOV PBOR EG IS US
SUBJECT: POSSIBLE GAMASY ATTENDANCE AT CAMP DAVID MEETING

REF: (A) STATE 207142, (B) CAIRO 18942, (C) TEL AVIV 10326

1. AS REPORTED REF B, ALTHOUGH GAMASY WOULD LIKE TO ATTEND CAMP DAVID MEETING, SADAT HAS NOT ASKED HIM TO BE A MEMBER OF THE EGYPTIAN DELEGATION AND GAMASY DOES NOT BELIEVE THE POINT SHOULD BE PRESSED WITH THE PRESIDENT. HE IS PROBABLY RIGHT IN THAT JUDGMENT UNLESS, OF COURSE, THERE IS A SPECIFIC PEG ON WHICH WE COULD LOGICALLY HANG A DEMARCHE ON THE UTILITY OF BRINGING GAMASY. IT WOULD HAVE TO BE MADE DIRECTLY TO SADAT, WHICH IS POSSIBLE EVEN IF HE IS "CONTEMPLATING" AT MIT ABUL KOM. THERE IS LITTLE POINT IN TRYING TO DO SO THROUGH MUBARAK, WHOSE RELATIONS WITH GAMASY ARE CORRECT ON THE SURFACE BUT STRAINED UNDERNEATH. FONMIN KAMEL, WHOM I ASKED LAST WEEK WHY GAMASY WAS NOT INCLUDED, IS PERSONALLY OPPOSED TO GAMASY'S PARTICIPATION AND IS SUSPICIOUS ABOUT OUR PURPOSE IN REPEATEDLY BROACHING SUBJECT EVER SINCE LEEDS CASTLE CONFERENCE. OUR POINT THAT IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 CAIRO 19041 161238Z

GAMASY IN CASE SECURITY DISCUSSIONS TAKE PLACE AND AS A MEANS OF RE-ENGAGING WEIZMAN IN THE PROCESS ARE NOT BOUGHT BY KAMEL.

2. I THINK THERE ARE SEVERAL REASONS WHY SADAT HAS NOT INCLUDED GAMASY ON THE DELEGATION: (A) HE VIEWS THE TALKS MAINLY AS POLITICAL RATHER THAN MILITARY AND

DESIRES TO MAKE A CLEAR SEPARATION BETWEEN THE POLITICAL AND THE MILITARY; (B) WHILE HE ADMIRES GAMASY'S MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM, HE QUESTIONS THE GENERAL'S POLITICAL SAVVY; (C) THERE IS CONCERN HERE, VOICED BY KAMEL BUT PROBABLY SHARED BY OTHER SENIOR EGYPTIANS, THAT THE INCLUSION OF GAMASY WOULD PROJECT A SIGNAL TO THE OTHER ARABS THAT SINAI IS ALSO BEING DISCUSSED. THE EGYPTIANS WANT THE CAMP DAVID TALKS TO FOCUS ON A DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND WITHDRAWAL FROM THE WEST BANK/GAZA IN RETURN FOR ADEQUATE SECURITY ASSURANCES AND NORMALIZATION AND NOT ON SINAI; AND (D) WHILE THERE IS AN UNDERSTAND-ABLE RELUCTANCE TO SAY THIS, SADAT IS AWARE THAT IT MAY BE PRUDENT TO HAVE GAMASY AT HOME WHEN ENGAGING IN POTENTIALLY SENSITIVE TALKS SUCH AS THOSE AT CAMP DAVID. IF ANY SUGGESTION EMERGES FROM THE TALKS THAT SADAT HAS AGREED TO COMPROMISE BEYOND MINOR RECTIFICATIONS IN THE WEST BANK, THE REACTION HERE AND IN THE ARAB WORLD COULD BE STRONGLY NEGATIVE AND GAMASY MIGHT BE NEEDED TO HANDLE A DECIDEDLY UNHAPPY MILITARY SECTOR. MUBARAK CANNOT DO THIS. NEITHER CAN C/S FAHMY OR ANY OF THE SENIOR GENERALS.

3. IN MENTIONING THE SINAI ASPECT, MY UNDERSTANDING IS THAT SADAT'S IDEAS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN A SINAI AGREEMENT AND A WEST BANK/GAZA SETTLEMENT REMAIN THOSE REPORTED CAIRO 7964 (NOTAL).

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 CAIRO 19041 161238Z

4. IF WE DECIDE THAT A DEMARCHE SHOULD BE MADE TO SADAT ON THE POSSIBILITY OF GAMASY PARTICIPATING, WE SHOULD DO SO ON THE BASIS OF A SPECIFIC ITEM OR ITEMS IN THE ANTICIPATED AGENDA THAT WOULD MAKE GAMASY'S PRESENCE (AS OPPOSED TO SOME OTHER EGYPTIAN GENERAL OFFICER AS ADVISER) ESSENTIAL. IT IS NOT ENOUGH TO SAY THAT WEIZMAN WILL BE THERE. NOW THAT THE ISRAELI MILITARY COMMUNICATIONS MISSION HAS BEEN EXPELLED, SADAT NO LONGER ATTACHES GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE GAMASY/WEIZMAN LINK AND IS ALSO SOMEWHAT DISILLUSIONED WITH WEIZMAN. THUS, OUR PROBLEM IS FINDING SOMETHING OUTSIDE OF SINAI ARRANGEMENTS WHICH WOULD MAKE GAMASY'S PRESENCE ESSENTIAL, NOT SIMPLY DESIRABLE.

5. IF IN YOUR PREPARATIONS FOR THE CAMP DAVID TALKS YOU HAVE BEEN ABLE TO IDENTIFY SUCH A POINT OR POINTS, AN APPROACH TO SADAT MIGHT REASONABLY BE MADE. BUT, DEPENDING UPON WHAT WE PROPOSE TO TRY TO PRESS ON PRESIDENT SADAT IN TERMS OF WEST BANK TERRITORIAL CONCESSIONS, WE SHOULD BEAR IN MIND POINT D IN PARA 2 ABOVE. EILTS

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